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Dual income taxation has become an increasingly
important blueprint for income tax reforms in
Europe.Originally constrained to the Nordic coun-
tries in the beginning of the 1990s, final withhold-
ing taxes on capital income have been introduced
in several European countries and tax reform pro-
posals in favour of a dual income tax system have
been made for Germany (Spengel/Wiegard, 2004)
and Switzerland (Keuschnigg, 2004).
The characteristic features and the economic back-
ground behind the dual income tax (DIT) has been
surveyed recently by Boadway (2004) in this jour-
nal.The purpose of our paper is to complement this
discussion by providing an overview of implement-
ed income tax structures.This discussion shows that
existing tax systems in many countries resemble
some characteristic features of a dual income tax
system.The scope of our analysis is not restricted to
the Nordic countries, we also include other Euro-
pean countries, which according to our view have
made steps towards a dual income tax system.Based
on this evidence an EU wide adoption of a dual
income tax system as sketched recently in a reform
agenda for European business taxation (Cnossen
2004) does not seem a complete-
ly unrealistic scenario.
The paper is organised as fol-
lows. We shortly review the pros
and cons of a comprehensive,
Schanz/Haig/Simons type, income
taxation. We then discuss some
aspects of the implementation of
the DIT in selected countries.
Finally we assess some of its
problems and end our discussion
with some concluding remarks.
The case for a dual income tax
The income tax system in Germany and in many
advanced countries is supposed to follow the prin-
ciple of comprehensive income taxation. Compre-
hensive income is defined as the net growth in the
tax payer’s personal wealth during one taxable
year. Comprehensive income has been favoured as
the best economic indicator of ability-to-pay,
ensuring horizontal equity – since tax payers with
the same ability-to-pay bear the same tax burden –
and vertical equity according to a graduated sched-
ule on different levels of comprehensive income.
Technically,under the Schanz/Haig/Simons system,
income from all sources is aggregated and total
income is subjected to the respective tax rate
defined by the progressive rate schedule.
Before presenting the main features of the DIT we
would like to identify some basic obstacles against
comprehensive income taxation. For this purpose,
let us sketch a simple view of the world where indi-
viduals choose their labour supply and invest in
human capital and financial wealth. The latter two
decisions are intertemporal in nature, as human
and financial capital formation are two alternative
investment strategies to increase future consump-
tion. The figure illustrates the resource flows and
the tax handles in such a basic model.
The skill acquired through human capital invest-
ment and the hours worked in the labour market
determine theses individuals’ effective wage in-
come. Alternatively, the individual can act as an
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FLOW OF RESOURCES IN A SIMPLE MODEL
Source: Authors.entrepreneur and receives imputed labour income
from business activity.
Intertemporal consumption smoothing can be
financed out of human or financial capital forma-
tion.Human capital investment will increase future
labour income, financial capital investment
increases future capital income but also allows for
using up the principal. Let us assume that savers
can directly invest in firms or save in domestic and
foreign bank accounts.The banks will lend the sav-
ings to domestic or foreign firms.
The market returns from the flows of resources are
taxable income for a government which is faced
with a given revenue requirement.Under a compre-
hensive income tax income from all sources is sub-
ject to the same tax rate. Optimal taxation, howev-
er, requires considering all tax handles separately.
Economic growth
In an intertemporal setting with savings in each
period, the tax burden on capital income accumu-
lates under comprehensive income taxation: the
tax is levied on income from investment which has
been financed out of income that has already been
taxed. Hence, any positive capital tax will discour-
age savings and, thus, capital supply to firms. In the
long run only a zero tax on capital income is com-
patible with a positive level of savings because the
tax burden on capital grows exponentially over
time.A similar case can be made for human capital
investment. A tax on labour income discourages
human capital formation because part of the return
on investment is taxed in all subsequent periods
(Jones, Manuelli and Rossi 1997) and double taxa-
tion of the returns can only avoided by a zero wage
tax.These arguments suggest that positive taxes on
the income of any factor that accumulates over
time are hard to justify. It is therefore necessary to
shortly explore the robustness of results.
The result in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997)
hinges on the assumption that no pure rents can be
created by investment in human capital. The zero
tax result does not hold if the accumulation tech-
nology is non-linear. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997)
demonstrate that the wage tax might be positive if
education costs are tax deductible. The intuition is
that the tax deductibility eliminates any distortions
of wage taxation on human capital investment. A
case for a non-zero capital tax is discussed in
Correia (1996), who makes a case for capital taxa-
tion assuming that the set of tax rates is con-
strained. Essentially, the argument here is derived
from an argument that also underlies the analysis
of open economy tax policy in Bucovetsky and
Wilson (1991):The government makes use of capi-
tal taxation in order to control the supply of labour
in an economy. This is, of course, a typical second-
best argument.
Tax competition
The internationalisation of capital markets supports
arguments against capital taxation. Let us return to
the model we sketched above in the figure and
assume that only the domestic government raises a
tax on domestic-source savings income.What will be
the consequence? The German government tested
this policy in 1989, when it announced a 10% with-
holding tax on interest income. The reaction of tax
payers becomes clear from a short inspection of the
figure. Economic intuition suggests that savers will
avoid this tax by investing in foreign banks. Even
though foreign banks might invest in domestic
firms, the domestic government is not able to raise
revenue from capital taxation. This nicely explains
the huge capital outflows Germany experienced in
1989, mainly to affiliates of German banks in
Luxembourg. Luxembourg banks used a large frac-
tion of the portfolio capital from German investors
for investment in German firms. Furthermore,
inspection of the figure suggests the simple argu-
ment that the foreign government has no incentive
to increase the capital tax, since undercutting
always increases tax revenue as long all taxes on
savings income are zero.
Other arguments rationalise a zero rate of the tax
on firms’ rental payments: Any positive tax rate
would reduce the net interest rate and cause a cap-
ital outflow.The capital outflow reduces the capital
intensity in domestic production and thereby
wages. However, wage income can be taxed more
directly using the wage tax. Along these lines, any
positive tax on capital might not be sustainable in
an open economy under the assumption that opti-
mal wage taxation is possible (Bucovetsky and
Wilson 1991).
Informational problems
The German experiment we analysed on the basis
of the figure supports the view that the foreign-
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source income of residents is unobservable to the
government. The government has to rely on the
willingness of the foreign tax authorities to
exchange information about the foreign-source
income of residents in order to enforce a tax on for-
eign-source and domestic-source capital income.
This exchange of information allows for residence-
based capital income taxation, which is at the heart
of the EU interest directive of 2003. International
information exchange is vital if comprehensive
income taxation calls for capital income to be taxed
at the same rate as labour income.
However, comprehensive income taxation avoids
another information problem.The tax authority need
not know the imputed wage income of firm owners
included in entrepreneurial profits, since labour and
capital income components are subject to the same
tax rate.These tax rates might differ, however, under
a DIT. This might create an incentive for entrepre-
neurs to manipulate the capital/labour income struc-
ture in order to minimise tax payments.
It is evident from this discussion of the figure that
comprehensive income taxation would certainly be
dominated by tax patterns which account for margins
of substitution that determine the intratemporal and
intertemporal decisions of rational tax payers.
The characteristic features of a dual income tax
The DIT is a schedular tax regime which divides
total income into capital and labour income and
regards them as different tax bases. This increases
an additional degree of freedom for tax policy,
which can potentially be used to attack some prob-
lems of comprehensive income taxation.
Under the DIT, capital income includes business
profits, dividends, interest income, rents, but also
rental values as well as capital gains on real capital
and property.Labour income consists of wages and
salaries, non-monetary fringe benefits, pension
payments and social security transfers. Capital
income is taxed at a flat rate, labour income on the
other hand is subject to progressive tax rates.Costs
of earning capital and labour income are tax
deductible from both tax bases.
The tax rate on capital income is equal to the
labour income tax rate in the lowest income brack-
et, which intends to ensure that labour and capital
income are taxed at similar rates. There is no gen-
eral recommendation in DIT proposals whether
negative capital income can be offset against posi-
tive labour income in the same period or can be
carried forward or backward and offset against
future or past capital income. However, personal
allowances are deductible from labour income and
thereby induce an element of indirect progressivi-
ty already in the first income bracket.
The DIT proposals do not seem to solve the prob-
lem of double taxation of dividends on distributed
profits at the corporate and the personal level in a
unique and definite way. Classical corporation tax
regimes would double tax dividends, but DIT is
also compatible with partial or full imputation of
the corporate income tax. Under imputation the
corporate income tax on distributed profits be-
comes a prepayment of the DIT on capital. Under
full imputation DIT administration can thus be
simplified by choosing the corporation tax rate
equal to the DIT rate. The corporation tax credit
would exactly cover the DIT liability.
Why is a dual income tax attractive?
Tax codes in virtually all industrialised countries
contain specific exemptions from the Schanz/Haig/
Simons standard, but nevertheless politicians pay
lip service to it. Most exemptions have been imple-
mented in a seemingly ad hoc manner to maintain
the assertion of redistributive capital income taxa-
tion and,at the same time,to master the challenges
caused by the new economic developments on cap-
ital markets.The result is a low level of tax revenue
combined with high compliance and collection
costs.The DIT is a well defined alternative variant
of a schedular system. It intends to create a level
playing field for capital investment by taxing all
capital income at the same flat DIT rate.
The DIT recognizes that the scope for progressive
capital income taxation is limited. Taxing capital
income by a final withholding tax at a flat and lower
rate significantly reduces tax compliance and collec-
tions costs compared to the present tax system in
Germany where a savings allowance (Sparer-
freibetrag) is operated. A proportional DIT can be
levied as a source tax without filing requirement. A
flat capital tax has the additional advantage of reduc-
ing the tax rate differential between domestic taxes
and source taxes in foreign countries, thereby limit-
ing the incentives for capital flight.In addition,lowertax rates also reduce the problem of negative after-
tax returns on real wealth under inflation. Finally, a
flexible adjustment of capital income taxation to
changing economic conditions as well as multilateral
co-ordination, e.g., in the EU, is possible under DIT.
Implementation of the dual income tax in the
Nordic countries
Table 1 surveys the main properties of the Nordic tax
systems. The Nordic countries implemented dual
income tax systems in the early 1990s, which exhibit
some common features (see e.g.,Sørensen 1994,1998;
Cnossen, 1999). Capital income is taxed at a flat rate
close to the corporation tax rate and close to the
labour tax rate in the first income bracket. Labour
income is taxed progressively. Indirect progression
enters in the first bracket due to personal exemptions,
then graduated marginal tax rates are applied to
labour income levels exceeding the first brackets.The
gap between labour taxation and capital taxation is
reinforced by the fact that most social security contri-
butions are included in the labour tax base.
A common problem in schedule systems is the mis-
declaration of income.In order to distinguish labour
and capital income in practice, an income splitting
model was constructed. Active owners, who are
working in their firms as managers or primary work-
ers are forced to split their business income into a
labour and a capital component. Basically, capital
income is defined as the imputed return on the
stock of business assets and the difference between
business income and imputed returns is classified as
labour income. The calculation of the imputed rate
of return is defined in national tax codes and differs
between the Nordic countries. Income splitting is
mandatory for sole proprietorships and partner-
ships, but also for corporations with active owners,
who must own a substantial share of their business
(e.g., two thirds) and work in their firm for a mini-
mum number of hours per year.
All Nordic countries allow for some integration of
capital and labour income,if capital income is neg-
ative. There is also integration of corporate and
capital income, although there are considerable
differences between the four Nordic countries,
ranging from full integration in Norway and Fin-
land to substantial double taxation in Sweden and
Denmark. A final characteristic feature of the
Nordic countries (with the exception of Denmark)
is that DIT is supplemented by a net wealth tax.
Sweden
In Sweden small corporations with active owners
are taxed by splitting dividend income into capital
income and labour income. Dividends are taxed as
capital income only if the imput-
ed return on the stock of busi-
ness assets is higher than the
actual return. This imputed
return is calculated by adding a
premium of five percentage
points to the interest rate on 10-
year government bonds.If actual
returns are higher than the
imputed return the residual is
treated as labour income and
taxed at the higher labour tax
rate.There is, however, a further
qualification to the splitting
method. Residual income above
a certain threshold is considered
as capital income and taxed at
the capital income tax rate.
Sweden operates a classical sys-
tem of corporate income taxa-
tion, although a reduced tax rate
applies at the personal level.
Furthermore, part of the labour
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Table 1
The Nordic dual income tax (2004 tax rates in %)
Norway Finland Sweden Denmark
DIT reform 1992 1993 1991 1987
PIT rates
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Net wealth tax 0.9 – 1.1 0.9 1.5 No
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costs may be added to the acquisition price of 
the shares.
Finland
Finland uses a similar method of income splitting.
The main difference is that the imputed return is cal-
culated on the net assets of the business. As in
Sweden, the difference between actual and imputed
dividends is taxed as labour income.Double taxation
of dividends is completely eliminated by imputation.
Norway
Norway also splits corporate income into a labour
and a capital component similar to Sweden and
Finland. However, the imputed rate of return is
equal to the interest rate on five year government
bonds plus a premium of 4 percent. In Norway,
imputed profits are calculated and the difference
to the profits (before interest payments) is taxed at
the labour tax rate, even if profits are retained.
There exists an upper bound for residual profits,
above which profits are taxed as capital income.
Moreover, entrepreneurs are entitled to make a
salary reduction of 20 percent in their wage bill
from the residual profits, which increases the share
of lower taxed capital income in dividend income.
Denmark 
Denmark was the first country to implement a DIT
as early as 1987, but deviated
from the government DIT pro-
posal immediately by taxing div-
idend income progressively.
Since 1994 a higher rate (cur-
rently 43 percent instead of 28
percent) is applied if dividend
income exceeds a threshold.
Dividends are subject to a 28%
withholding tax, which is final
for dividend income below the
threshold and credited against
PIT for dividend income above
the threshold. The Danish
income tax code distinguishes
personal income, capital income
and income from shares. But
only income from shares is
taxed at a reduced rate, while
personal and capital income is
jointly taxed according to the
progressive schedule. Contrary to the other three
Nordic countries Denmark implemented tax
reforms, marking a retreat from the DIT concept,
which guided the tax reform of 1987 (Sørensen
1998, p. 24).
Final withholding income taxes in Austria,
Belgium and Italy
Austria,Belgium and Italy did not introduce a fully
fledged DIT but a final withholding tax on interest
income and dividend income. Labour income as
well as earned business income labour income is
subject to a progressive schedule. There is, howev-
er, a DIT element in corporate and non-corporate
income taxation in Austria and in Italy, as a share
of business profits, calculated as an imputed return
on newly injected capital, is subject to a reduced
tax rate.In contrast to the Nordic countries there is
no integration of earned income and negative cap-
ital income,but Austria and Belgium allow for a fil-
ing option for low capital income earners, which
implies that filed capital income is taxed according
to the progressive earned income tax schedule.
All three countries tax dividend income at the cor-
porate and the personal level.The corporation tax
on dividends is supplemented by a final withhold-
ing tax on dividends at the personal level.The com-
bined tax burden on equity profits is therefore
close to the top PIT rate on earned income.
Table 2
Final withholding taxes on capital income (2004 rates in %)
Austria Belgium Italy
Tax reform 1994 1993 1991
PIT rates








Basic allowance for capital
income Filing option Filing option No
Offset of negative capital
income No No No






CIT rate 34/25 34 (35.02) 33 (37.25)/19
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Net wealth tax % No No No
Source: BMF (2003), BMF (2005).DIT elements generating a lower tax rate on capi-
tal income are restricted to interest income, which
is subject to the low final withholding tax. In addi-
tion, dividend income on newly injected capital is
taxed at a reduced CIT rate of 25 percent (instead
of 34 percent) in Austria and at a reduced CIT rate
of 19 percent (instead of 33 peercent) in Italy.
It should also be noted that Italy operated an im-
putation system up to 2003 and moved to a “clas-
sical system” with PIT rate reduction only in 2004.
Special regimes for capital income taxation in
Greece and the Netherlands
The Netherlands and Greece recently also moved
towards DIT, even though the tax relief for capital
income is based on specific regulations which do
not show precisely the features of the Nordic DIT.
The Netherlands implemented a comprehensive
tax reform in 2001 which subjects dividend and
interest income to a presumptive income tax at the
personal level. The presumptive PIT is levied at a
rate of 30 percent on capital income, which is cal-
culated by applying an imputed return of 4 percent
on the average net value of assets in the tax period.
The imputed PIT is equivalent to a 1.2 percent
wealth tax on net assets and covers capital income
of asset holders from dividends, interest and royal-
ties.Personal allowances cause an indirect progres-
sion at the personal level of this “Box 3” type
investment. Dividends, interest and capital gains
from substantial shareholding are classified as
“Box 2” type investment income and are taxed at a
flat PIT rate of 25 percent.
Greece is the only EU country which exempts divi-
dends at the personal level.Thus,dividends are taxed
at the CIT rate of 35 percent, which is only slightly
lower than the top PIT rate of 40 percent. The tax
relief is more pronounced for interest income, which
is subject to a final withholding tax (10 percent on
bonds and 15 percent on bank deposits).
Problems of running a dual income tax
While it is recognized that the Nordic DIT has a
number of advantages over the hybrid and widely
eroded comprehensive income tax systems,there is
no doubt that the DIT system implemented by the
Nordic countries should not be regarded as an
ideal solution for income taxation in practice.
There have been a series of amendments to
improve the DIT systems and further reform steps
are called for (Sørensen, 2003).
One major problem of operating a DIT is the sepa-
ration of business income into capital and labour
income. Calculation of capital income by imputing
an average return on business assets is a crude mea-
sure and does not pay proper attention to the oppor-
tunity costs of capital. Moreover, the prescription of
the imputation rate by the tax code has to be regard-
ed as the outcome of a political game. Multiple
imputation rates reduce transparency of the social
bargaining process and will almost certainly not gen-
erate economically desirable results.
Separating capital and labour income by imputing a
normal rate of return to capital investment is a pro-
cedure open to criticism. The residual income does
not only comprise labour income but includes eco-
nomic rents, risk premia and windfall profits which
may be regarded as capital returns rather than
labour returns.Thus the question arises if these com-
ponents of residual income should qualify for pref-
erential taxation as well.The Norwegian experience
of residual income thresholds and salary deductions
characterise the scope of political lobbying for pref-
erential tax treatment (Christiansen 2004).
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Table 3 
Special tax regimes on capital income
(2004 rates in %) 
Netherlands Greece
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Net wealth tax % 1.2 (levied as
presumptive PIT)
No
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While a level playing field for highly mobile capital
investment is a crucial desideratum,non-integration
of CIT and PIT, preferential treatment of capital
returns and nominal interest taxation provoke tax
arbitrage and investment distortions. At the same
time, however, capital tax arbitrage is less of a prob-
lem under DIT as a matter of a lower tax rate.
Finally one major advantage of DIT, the substan-
tial reduction in compliance, collection and control
costs has not been exploited fully in the past. The
filing option for capital income owners, the possi-
bility for labour income earners to offset capital
losses or the different treatment of domestic and
foreign capital income are costly methods of tax
administration and certainly deserve further atten-
tion in DIT reform steps.
Concluding remarks
Starting out in four Nordic countries, dual income
taxation has gained broad support in many European
countries. Although evidence in those countries as
well as in other countries following an impure DIT
approach reveals that it is not an easy task to imple-
ment separate taxation of capital and labour income,
there seems to be little pressure in these countries to
return to comprehensive income taxation.
One major advantage of DIT is the easy integra-
tion of CIT and PIT. Although the current picture
of corporate income taxation in Europe exhibits a
clear affinity towards classical double taxation
(mitigated by low CIT rates and a reduced PIT
rate) Finland and Norway show that imputation
can be easily administered by CIT credits, which
fully cover the DIT on dividends if CIT and DIT
rates coincide.
Incentives for strategic income shifting between
capital and labour income can be considerably
reduced if the PIT rate of the first income bracket
and the DIT rate coincide. Gains in compliance
and collection costs due to this tying of tax rates
must nevertheless be confronted with the costs of
reduced flexibility. Flexibility seems to be an
important factor if the national CIT rate has to be
adjusted in international tax competition or as a
result of negotiated tax harmonisation.
The economic attractiveness of DIT is emphasised by
recent reform proposals for Germany (Spengel/
Wiegard 2004) and Switzerland (Dietz/Keuschnigg
2004) calling for DIT system in both countries.DIT is
also regarded as a desirable starting point for co-ordi-
nating corporate income taxation in the EU (Cnossen
2004).If the tax rates on capital and labour differ then
co-ordination steps in capital income taxation should
face less opposition by national governments because
the tax rate autonomy on labour income remains
unaffected and might even be extended to sub-feder-
al levels without provoking capital flight.
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